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The Case for Continued Judicial
Enforcement of the AT&T Decree
by John R. Worthington*
I
Introduction
In 1982, after eight years of litigation between the United
States and the former Bell System, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia entered judgment in United
States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.' The most im-
portant relief afforded by that historic judgment, also known as
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), was contained in two
complementary provisions. One required divestiture of the
Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) by AT&T and the other re-
stricted the divested BOCs to the local telephone business un-
less they could prove that a proposed diversification would not
significantly lessen competition in that new line of business.2
Both the divestiture and the corollary line-of-business restric-
tions were intended to take away the incentive, inevitably re-
sulting from BOC participation in related markets, to use
control of the local telephone network to compete unfairly in
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1. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) [hereinafter AT&T].
The judgment is often called the Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ) because the
proposed settlement was presented as an agreed "modification" of the 1956 consent
decree settling an earlier antitrust case brought by the United States against the Bell
System, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action No. 17-49 (D.N.J. filed Jan.
14, 1949). See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 140-41, 144 n.51. The MFJ is appended to the
AT&T decision at 552 F. Supp. 226. This also explains why post-judgment decisions of
the district court are captioned United States v. Western Elec. Co.
2. Section II (D) of the MFJ prohibits the BOCs from providing interexchange
(i.e., long distance) telecommunications services or information services, manufactur-
ing telecommunications equipment, or providing any other product or service (other
than exchange communications, marketing of customer premises equipment, and di-
rectory advertising) that is not a natural monopoly actually regulated by tariff. See
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 227-28.
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new markets.3
Now, just a few short years later, the BOCs are strongly sup-
porting legislation that would strip from the federal courts
authority to enforce the MFJ.4 Expecting the Federal Comm-
unications Commission (FCC or Commission) to water down
the MFJ's line-of-business restrictions (which tend to keep the
BOCs focused on their bread-and-butter local telephone busi-
ness), the BOCs want the FCC to take over the courts' enforce-
ment responsibility. It was the current Administration which
insisted on the line-of-business restrictions as a condition of set-
tling the AT&T case; it is the same Administration which sur-
prisingly supports this court-stripping legislation.
This article explains why this proposed legislation is unnec-
essary, unconstitutional, and dangerous. The transfer legisla-
tion ignores the crucial and recent lessons that led to the
inclusion of these restrictions in the consent decree: the BOCs
have unrestricted ability and overwhelming incentive to abuse
their control of the bottleneck local networks; and the FCC was
and is unable to prevent bottleneck abuse. There has been no
change since 1982 in any of the factors that made the line-of-
business restrictions, enforced by the district court, necessary
in the first place. Therefore, the federal courts should continue
to administer this antitrust decree, including its restrictions on
BOC entry into the long distance and other telecommunica-
tions businesses.
II
Compelling Reasons Justified Imposition of the
Line-of-Business Restrictions
To understand why the line-of-business restrictions are nec-
essary and why they need to be enforced by the federal courts,
it is necessary to understand the reasons why those restrictions
were included in the MFJ in the first place. Those restrictions
have three sources: the competitive theory underlying the De-
partment of Justice's antitrust action, the evidentiary record of
the AT&T trial, and the legal standards governing antitrust
consent decree remedies.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 5-29.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 49-63 for an example of this legislation.
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A. The Restrictions Reflect the Competitive Theory of the AT&T
Case
1. Vertical Integration by BOC Local Monopolies Creates
the Incentive and Ability to Discriminate and
Cross-Subsidize
Both the monopolization action against AT&T and the impo-
sition of the line-of-business restrictions at the conclusion of
that action were premised on the existence of BOC monopoly
power flowing from the local exchange bottleneck. Through
discrimination, cross-subsidization, and other types of anticom-
petitive conduct, the BOCs are able to leverage their monopoly
power to impede competition and favor their affiliated enter-
6prises. As the Department of Justice explained in 1982:
The theory of both the Western Electric and AT&T cases was
that, as a rate base/rate of return regulated monopolist, AT&T
has had both the in[c]entive and the ability, through cross-sub-
sidization and discriminatory actions, to leverage the power it
enjoys in its regulated monopol[y] markets to foreclose or im-
pede competition in related, potentially competitive markets.
The linchpin of AT&T's monopoly power . . . was its owner-
ship and control, through the BOCs, of regulated local ex-
change monopolies.7
The source of the incentives and ability for anticompetitive
conduct inhered in the structure of the industry. The basis for
the Department's monopolization allegations against AT&T
was that the exclusionary conduct resulted directly from the
integrated structure of the Bell System and the existence of
both regulated monopoly and competitive enterprises within
the same firm.8 It was this "structure and organization" that
5. See, e.g., AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161-62, 165-66, 187-88.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 851-52, (D.D.C.
1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
7. Response of the United States to Public Comments on Proposed Modification
of Final Judgment, United States v. Western Elec. Co. (AT&T), 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982) (No. 82-0192), 47 Fed. Reg. 23,320, 23,335 (1982) [hereinafter Response of
United States].
8. The competitive theory of the AT&T case was not merely an exercise in ab-
stract economic logic or policy, but rather stemmed from
evidence plainly show[ing] a consistent course of anticompetitive conduct in
both the telecommunications equipment and intercity services markets, in-
cluding unreasonable and unnecessary restrictions on the interconnection of
customer-provided terminal equipment, anticompetitive restrictions on the
interconnection of other intercity common carriers to AT&T's essential facil-
ities, biased and anticompetitive procurement practices and pricing strata-
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"provided both the incentive and opportunities for defendants
which predictably produced anticompetitive reactions by de-
fendants to the introduction of competition."9 Accordingly, the
fundamental purpose of divestiture and the line-of-business re-
strictions was to "eliminate the anticompetitive incentives and
abilities which were.., the very conditions that gave rise to the
Western Electric and AT&T cases."' 0
2. Injunctive Relief and Regulation Cannot Prevent
Anticompetitive BOC Conduct
"[B]ecause defendants' illegal monopolization and exclusion-
ary behavior flow inherently from their structure,"" the De-
partment of Justice consistently maintained throughout the
AT&T case that "injunctive relief cannot be effective" and that
a vertically integrated firm could "frustrate any injunctive re-
lief to preserve its illegal monopolies."' 2 The inability of any
relief short of divestiture and prohibition on reintegration to
prevent anticompetitive behavior necessitated "the central re-
medial mechanism of the modification:'
13
At 'the heart of the government's case in United States v.
AT&T was the failure of regulation to safeguard competition in
the face of the powerful incentives and abilities of a firm en-
gaged in the provision of both regulated monopoly and compet-
itive services.... Neither of these problems [of discrimination
and cross-subsidization] has thus far proven amenable to suc-
cessful regulatory solution .... Thus, permitting BOC entry
into competitive markets would undermine the rationale of di-
vestiture .... 1
gems based not on greater efficiencies, but instead solely upon
considerations of theeffects of such pricing on defendants' market share.
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Involuntary Dismis-
sal Under Rule 41(b) at 2, (filed Aug. 16, 1981) United States v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (No. 74-1698) [hereinafter Opposition
Memorandum].
9. Plaintiff's First Statement of Contentions and Proof at 1 (filed Nov. 1, 1978),
United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 [hereinafter First Statement].
10. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,323.
11. First Statement, supra note 9, at 526.
12. Id. See 552 F. Supp. at 170 ("[T]he choice is between a Bell System restrained
by neither regulation nor true competition and a Bell System reorganized in such a
way as to diminish greatly the possibility of future anticompetitive behavior.").
13. Response of the United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
14. Id. See Brief of the United States in Response to the Court's Memorandum of
May 25, 1982 at 3-4, 26-29 (filed June 14, 1982) AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No. 74-1698)
[hereinafter June 14 Brief]; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 855
n.20 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal dismissed, 777 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Indeed, the Department emphasized that integration by rate-
regulated bottleneck monopolists into related, competitive
markets creates inherent anticompetitive problems that, absent
divestiture and a ban on reintegration, are "otherwise
insoluble."15
It was on this basis that the district court approved the judg-
ment under the Tunney Act's "public interest" standard.
16
Both the Department and the court recognized that regulation
could not "ensure non-discriminatory access to essential local
exchange facilities."' 7 As the Department explained:
Particularly in a technologically dynamic industry such as tele-
communications, there is little possibility that regulation is ca-
pable of detecting or preventing the very subtle forms of
discrimination that would be available to the BOCs. Thus,
even were it possible to prescribe in detail the appropriate
technical parameters of interconnection under current tech-
nological conditions, regulators would have to have sufficient
foresight to determine in advance the discriminatory potential
inherent in tomorrow's technology, effectively to ensure fair
competition. Even if it were possible, moreover, effectively to
monitor the technical aspects of interconnection in an evolving
technological environment, there would remain still more sub-
tle means of discrimination in operational activities, such as
timely provision, maintenance, testing, and restoration of
facilities.1
8
Similarly, the court rejected alternative, non-structural rem-
edies because it would remain possible "to shift from one an-
ticompetitive activity to another, as various alternatives were
foreclosed through the actions of regulators or the courts or as
a result of technological development.' 9 The line-of-business
restrictions were deemed essential to the MFJ because "the
BOCs, if permitted to engage in competitive activities, would
have substantial ability to frustrate regulatory attempts to pre-
vent discriminatory conduct.
'20
15. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
16. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 168-70; see also id. at 167-68 (rejecting injunctive relief
and regulation as alternatives). The Tunney Act, the popular name for the Antitrust
Procedures and Penalties Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) (1986), requires federal courts to
apply a public interest standard in reviewing proposed antitrust consent decrees after
notice and an opportunity for public comment.
17. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at
168 & nn.154-55.
18. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
19. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 167-68 (footnote omitted).
20. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,336.
1986)
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The Department emphasized that the incentive for cross-
subsidization is similarly an unavoidable consequense of BOC
integration into the interexchange services, information serv-
ices, and equipment manufacturing markets, and that regula-
tion is fundamentally incapable of preventing anticompetitive
pricing practices 2' "There is simply no single correct formula
for the allocation of... common costs among [competitive and
noncompetitive] services," and
even if such a formula existed, the possession by the BOCs of
relevant cost information, the extent of common costs, and the
high degree of discretion in the treatment of such costs enjoyed
by BOCs, would very likely frustrate meaningful regulatory
oversight, especially in light of strong incentives on the part of
the BOCs to do so.
22
3. Effective Relief Requires Line-of-Business Restrictions
As a Necessary Complement to Divestiture
From the inception of the AT&T case, the Department of
Justice sought relief designed to eliminate "the existing inher-
ent, structural incentive and ability"2 3 to monopolize competi-
tive telecommunications markets, particularly those dependent
on access to BOC local distribution facilities. As initially pro-
posed to the district court in 1978, the relief included "separa-
tion of intercity facilities from local facilities [in order] to
eliminate the incentive and ability of a joint provider of inter-
city and local communications services to deny or delay the
ability of other enterprises to provide competing intercity serv-
ices....,24 An essential corollary of this separation was a ban
on vertical reintegration: "The local operating companies will
consist of the local distribution systems of the current compa-
nies [and] would be prohibited from owning any intercity facili-
ties [or being] affiliated with any owner of intercity facilities.
25
The divestiture of the BOCs from AT&T, by separating the
21. "[Tlhe very basis of divestiture is that the anticompetitive problems inherent
in the joint provision of regulated monopoly and competitive services are otherwise
insoluble." Id.
22. Id. United States v. Western Elec. Co. 592 F. Supp at 854 n.19, 854-55 (The
consent decree's remedy "is preferable to a regulatory one. Cost misallocations and
improper transfer pricing in interaffilate sales have proved difficult, if not impossible,
to detect. It is for that reason that regulatory oversight has not been in the past, nor is
it likely to be in the future, an adequate check .....
23. First Statement, supra note 9, at 526-27.
24. Id. at 527.
25. Id. See also Stipulation Package 82, Contentions 15-39 (No. 74-1698).
[Vol. 9:75
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regulated exchange monopoly from competitive, or potentially
competitive, markets, divorced the ability for anticompetitive
behavior from the incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct.
The line-of-business restrictions were the "necessary comple-
ment" to this structural separation.26
Absent the modification's restrictions on BOC lines of busi-
ness, the BOCs would have the very same incentives and abil-
ity to foreclose or impede competition in related markets.
Thus, given the BOCs' continuing status as regulated monopo-
lies, the modification's line-of-business restrictions are in-
tended to ensure, consistent with the obligations of this Court,
"that there remain no practices likely to result in monopoliza-
tion in the future. 27
In sum, the judgment includes the prohibitions on BOC rein-
tegration into the interexchange services, information services,
and equipment manufacturing lines of business to "prevent the
recurrence of precisely the same structural and economic in-
centives that divestiture was designed to eliminate. ' 2 As coun-
sel for the Department emphasized during the Tunney Act
hearing on the restrictions, "[i]n a very real sense, the restric-
tions are simply the opposite side of the divestiture coin.., and
proceed on precisely the same theory that divestiture proceeds
on.")
2 9
B. The Evidentiary Record of the AT&T Case Vividly
Demonstrated the Anticompetitive Dangers of a Vertically
Integrated Telecommunications Network
The evidence introduced during the trial of the AT&T case
demonstrated the prima facie existence of the anticompetitive
behavior arising from the Bell System's integrated structure.
Although the entry of the consent decree precluded any ulti-
mate finding on liability,"0 the court had addressed the bulk of
the affirmative evidence when it denied AT&T's motion for dis-
missal. As the court stated unequivocally, the evidence
presented in the government's case-in-chief "sustaine[d] the
government's basic contentions" and "demonstrate[d] that the
Bell System ha[d] violated the antitrust laws in a number of
26. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,323.
27. Id. at 23,335. See June 14 Brief, supra note 14, at 5-6.
28. June 14 Brief, supra note 14, at 7.
29. Trial Transcript at 25,179, AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No. 74-1698) (Oral argu-
ment by James P. Denvir, June 29, 1982).
30. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161.
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ways over a lengthy period of time."31
The evidentiary record in AT&T includes testimony of FCC
officials to the effect that the Commission was fundamentally
unable to regulate an integrated Bell System. 2 It includes
hundreds of instances of discriminatory conduct in the inter-
connection of competing (or potentially competing) telecom-
munications services providers and in the purchase of
equipment manufactured by Bell System competitors. 3 As the
evidence demonstrated, the use of BOC local monopoly power
to frustrate the ability of competing interexchange carriers to
gain reasonable, nondiscriminatory interconnections spanned a
period of more than a decade following the FCC's first authori-
zation of competitive entry.3 4 The record also included substan-
31. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336, 1381 (D.D.C.
1981). The court specifically found that the Department had produced evidence suffi-
cient to establish a violation, and shift the burden of proof to the defendants, with
regard to discriminatory treatment of interexchange competitors, interconnection of
customer-owned customer premises equipment, and procurement of telecommunica-
tions equipment. Id.
32. AT&T, 552 F. Supp at 168 & n.156; Trial Transcripts, United States v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698, at 10,463-744 (testimony of Walter Hinchman) (June
18, 1981); Trial Transcripts, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698, at
9296-805 (testimony of William Melody) (June 18, 1981). Just prior to trial, the De-
partment of Justice characterized this evidence as showing "that state and federal
regulators are unable to deal effectively either with exclusionary and other anticom-
petitive behavior employed by defendants to preserve and maintain their monopolies
or with the basic underlying structural problem which creates the incentives for an-
ticompetitive conduct." Plaintiff's Third Statement of Contentions and Proof at 7,
(filed Jan. 10, 1980) (No. 74-1698) AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 [hereinafter Third State-
ment]. The court agreed. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 170.
33. In support of its allegation that AT&T had monopolized telecommunications
services (including intercity or interexchange services), the Department of Justice
marshalled evidence regarding: (1) exclusion of potential competition in video pro-
gramming transmission; (2) exclusion of potential competition in privately operated
microwave systems; (3) exclusion of potential competition in audio/video program-
ming transmission by common carriers and domestic satellite common carriers; (4)
exclusion of potential competition in common carrier private line services by AT&T's
competitors (principally MCI); (5) exclusion of potential competition in common car-
rier private line services by domestic satellite common carriers; (6) exclusion of poten-
tial competition in common carrier digital data private line services by common
carriers (principally Datran); (7) exclusion of potential competition in common car-
rier regular long-distance services; and (8) exclusion of potential competition in cable
television. Third Statement, supra note 32, at 85-1069. See United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1353 n.68 (specifying evidence). Private litigants
proved many of the same kinds of anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., MCI Communi-
cations Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1139-60 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Litton Systems v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 700 F.2d 785,
790-802 (2d Cir. 1983) (discrimination against competing equipment manufacturers),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
34. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161 & nn.123-25; United States v. American Tel. &
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tial expert economic testimony on the necessity of structural
relieiP5 and on the relation between vertical integration and the
incentives for both discrimination and cross-subsidization.36
The line-of-business restrictions followed directly from the
evidence adduced in the AT&T case. When Judge Harold H.
Greene suspended the trial to consider whether the divestiture
and associated line-of-business restrictions in the proposed con-
sent decree were in the public interest, he had heard most of
the evidence and was ready to rule.37 Without a thorough famil-
iarity with that record, it is impossible to evaluate the range of
Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. at 1353-57; Third Statement, supra note 32, at 388-725, 968-91;
Opposition Memorandum, supra note 8, at 7. ("[D]uring the past three decades, and
particularly since the late 1960s, AT&T has engaged in a comprehensive course of
conduct to willfully maintain its monopoly in the intercity telecommunications serv-
ices market. As each new competitor has appeared, AT&T has carried the battle
against competition outside the regulatory arena and into the marketplace where it
has exploited its enormous monopoly power to maintain its monopoly position in the
market.... [T]he major features of AT&T's exclusionary conduct in the intercity
services market have been the manipulation of the terms and conditions under which
competitors are permitted to interconnect.... ."); Trial Testimony at 5,508-726, United
States v. Amercian Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (testimony of Bert C. Roberts) (April
27, 1981); Trial Transcripts at 3,549-4,107, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
No. 74-1698 (testimony of Willam G. McGowan) (April 9-10 & 13, 1981); Stipulation
Package 24B, Contentions 1, 27, 35; Stipulation Package 26, Contentions 5, 6, 15, 116,
205-17; Stipulation Package 23, Stipulations 3-4 & Contentions 3-4, 14, 23, 25, 55; PX
425, 1455, 2244.
35. Trial Transcripts at 10,996, United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-
1698 (testimony of Bruce Owen) (June 22, 1981) ("AT&T, by virtue of its possession of
the local bottleneck monopolies at the local exchange level, has the power and incen-
tive to vertically foreclose competition in services markets and equipment markets.
The only kind of relief that is likely to be effective in dealing with the monopolization
of [these] market[s], and the incentive to maintain that monopoly and the ability to
maintain that monopoly, is structural relief that fundamentally changes the incen-
tives of managers involved. That means separating the local exchange facilities from
the intercity services affiliate.").
36. See, e.g., Trial Transcripts at 10,948-49, 10,950, 10,960-61, United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (testimony of Bruce Owen) (June 22, 1981).
The government also presented testimony by Frederick R. Warren-Boulton to the
effect that a combination of regulation and vertical integration produces biased equip-
ment procurement decisions, Trial Transcripts at 11,305-77, United States v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 74-1698 (testimony of Frederick R. Warren-Boulton) (June 25,
1981). The court agreed. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 524 F. Supp. at
1373-74 & n.157.
37. Judge Greene noted that when the proposed settlement was submitted for
judicial approval, he had heard "what probably amount[ed] to well over ninety per-
cent of the parties' evidence both quantitatively and qualitatively, as well as all of
their legal arguments." AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152. "The government [had] presented
close to one hundred witnesses, many thousands of documents, and additional
thousands of stipulations." Id. at 140. The defendants had "presented approximately
250 witnesses and tens of thousands of pages of documents." Id. The court stated that
if the parties did not accept certain changes in the proposed judgment that it con-
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anticompetitive conduct the BOCs used, and could successfully
use again, to foreclose effective competition in the inter-
exchange, information services, and equipment manufacturing
markets.38
C. The Restrictions Requested by the Department of Justice
Arose from Established Legal Standards Governing the
Purpose and Scope of Antitrust Consent Decree
Remedies
As the district court held in approving the judgment, an anti-
trust consent decree must foreclose the avenues for anticompe-
titive conduct and effectively pry open markets to allow the
development of competition.39 The remedy must be sufficient
to prevent recurrence of the exclusionary behavior that permit-
ted monopolization in the first instance.40  Thus, consistent
with the Department of Justice's evidence at trial, the court re-
jected regulatory and injunctive relief (such as separate subsid-
iaries) because such remedies would have no effect on the
incentive for anticompetitive conduct and could not effectively
constrain the ability to leverage the bottleneck monopoly of the
BOCs.
4 1
cluded were necessary to protect the public interest, it was prepared either to resume
the trial or "make its decision based on the present record." Id. at 153 n.95.
38. "[I]nasmuch as the court looked to the state of proof at trial to determine that
the divestiture was in the public interest, it would be irresponsible now to construe
the decree without reference to its history, lest we be condemned to repeat that his-
tory." Reply of the United States to Responses to the Department's Proposals Regard-
ing Section VIII(C) Waivers at 14 (filed April 5, 1984), United States v. Western Elec.
Co., 592 F. Supp. 846 (D.D.C. 1984) (No. 82-0192) [hereinafter April 5 Reply].
39. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 150 (citing International Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 401 (1947).
40. Under this prophylactic standard, relief can include restrictions on behavior
that, standing alone, might not independently violate the antitrust laws. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. at 186; United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868-69. As the
Department of Justice explained to the court during hearings on the decree, although
the BOCs are not likely to remonopolize competitive markets immediately, "it's
equally true that they can take actions that will harm competition, that will harm
consumers even in the absence of establishing a monopoly in the reasonably near fu-
ture. It is that possibility that the restrictions are directed toward." Trial Transcripts
at 25, 180-81, (No. 74-1698) (Oral argument of James P. Denvir June 29, 1982).
41. See, e.g., AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 167-70, 187 n.229, 193 n.251; United States v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 869 & nn.97, 98; June 14 Brief, supra note 14,
at 31; Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,336-37 (Separate subsidiaries and
regulatory proscriptions against discrimination "would not affect the incentives to en-
gage in anticompetitive conduct .... [Although] a separate subsidiary requirement
may eliminate some of the avenues for anticompetitive abuse, it cannot effectively
foreclose all of the ways in which the BOCs would discriminate in favor of a separate
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The line-of-business restrictions were imposed "to prevent
the occurrence or reoccurrence of anticompetitive conduct by
the [BOCs] - each of which retains in its particular area a mo-
nopoly over local telecommunications service and thus has the
potential for using its monopoly power to discriminate against
others .... ,,42 The restrictions therefore "constituted an essen-
tial ingredient of the decree. '43 Indeed, the judgment, includ-
ing the restrictions of section II(D), provides "precisely the
relief" for which the government litigated the AT&T case."
The record compiled in 1982 therefore provided overwhelm-
ing evidence that the line-of-business restrictions were essen-
tial to protect the public interest. In the Tunney Act
proceedings leading up to the entry of the judgment, Judge
Greene heard the views of literally hundreds of persons and
government agencies who submitted thousands of pages of
comments. Based on his careful review of those submissions
and his long familiarity with the evidence submitted by the
government and the Bell System during the trial, Judge
Greene concluded that these restrictions were necessary ele-
ments of effective antitrust relief45 and the Supreme Court af-
firmed that judgment.46
III
The Proposed Transfer Legislation Is Unjustified
and Unconstitutional
Notwithstanding the compelling justifications for the en-
forcement mechanisms in the MFJ and the exhaustive consid-
eration that preceded its recent adoption, the BOCs are actively
affiliate providing competitive products and services .... [Moreover,] even assuming
sufficient cost separation between a BOC and its competitive affiliate to prevent cross-
subsidization, the BOC would still have numerous opportunities for discrimination in
the terms and conditions of access to facilities which are essential for the provision of
competitive services").
42. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 852.
43. Id. at 859.
44. Response of United States, 47 Fed. Reg. at 23,323; Trial Transcript at 25,091,
AT&T, (No. 74-1698) (Oral argument by Ronald G. Carr, June 29, 1982); Trial Tran-
script at 25,093, (No. 74-1698) (Oral argument by Howard J. Trienens, General Cous-
nel, AT&T, June 29, 1982) ("the Department got exactly what it wanted, not only as
spelled out in Episode 82 last year in this courthouse, but it goes back as far as Novem-
ber of '78 when this particular form of split was first specifically asked for by the
government").
45. See AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 186-91.
46. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
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seeking to escape from its strictures. Although the consent de-
cree entitles the BOCs to a waiver of the line-of-business re-
strictions if they show that there is no substantial possibility
that they could use their local monopoly power to impede com-
petition in the market of their new venture,47 the BOCs have
not gone to Judge Greene to contend that they should be per-
mitted under this standard to enter any market dependent on
access under the local exchange.
Recognizing that they could not prove their case on the mer-
its in federal court, the BOCs have instead asked Congress to
provide them the relief they seek. To this end, the BOCs have
supported legislation that would transfer enforcement respon-
sibility for the MFJ from the federal courts to the FCC. The
leading example of such legislation in the last session of Con-
gress was Senate Bill 2565.48 Senate Bill 2565 was not reported
out of committee in the second session of the 99th Congress,
but the BOCs will likely attempt to resurrect that bill in the
first session of the 100th Congress.
The following discussion explains some of the legal and pol-
icy arguments why continued effective federal court enforce-
ment of the line-of-business restrictions is essential. Section
III(A) of this article describes the provisions and purpose of
Senate Bill 2565 as a concrete example of possible transfer leg-
islation. Section III(B) demonstrates that such legislation is an
unconstitutional congressional attempt to subject the injunc-
tive decree of a federal court to continuing supervisory review
by a non-judicial branch of government. Section III(C) dis-
cusses why no change in the forum for administering the con-
sent decree is necessary and why, in any event, the FCC is a
wholly unsuitable body for that job.
A. Senate Bill 2565
The most debated piece of transfer legislation in the last Con-
gress was Senate Bill 2565, introduced on June 18, 1986, by Sen-
ator Robert Dole (R-Kansas) as the "Federal Telecom-
munications Policy Act of 1986." The Bill would have empow-
ered the FCC to modify the court's judgment, and to control
the district court's decisions applying the judgment, without
47. For a more detailed discussion of the waiver provision, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 113-16.
48. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S7750 (1986).
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making any change in the substantive law underlying the MFJ
decree.
As stated by its sponsor, Senate Bill 2565 was "quite simple in
its thrust. '49 Its declared purpose was "to displace executory
decrees of a federal court." 50 The Bill would have accom-
plished this through four key provisions.
Section 201 of the Bill commanded the FCC to adopt as "reg-
ulations" the presently operable provisions of the AT&T and
GTE decrees pending in the district court.5' The Bill itself
claimed not to make any substantive changes in the court's de-
crees, and thus would have required the FCC to adopt both the
line-of-business restrictions and the standard that these restric-
tions may be removed only on a showing that "there is no sub-
stantial possibility" that a local carrier "could use its monopoly
power to impede competition in the market it seeks to enter. '52
Since the Bill was designed to address the issues in two particu-
lar lawsuits, "provisions of the Bill would be applicable only to
AT&T, GTE, the BOCs, and the GTOCs."S
Section 202 of the Bill provided that the FCC may enforce
these regulations through its "cease and desist" power, as well
as any other remedy provided in the Federal Communications
Act of 1934. These remedies, of course, would not have in-
cluded the civil and criminal contempt power held by the dis-
trict court.54
Section 203 would have given the FCC power to "modify or
rescind any provision of any regulation promulgated pursuant
to section 201."1 The accompanying report explained that this
provision was designed to establish that the FCC has power to
make modifications "notwithstanding the congressional direc-
49. 132 CONG. REC. S7742 (daily ed. June 18, 1986) (statement of Senator Dole).
50. Id. at S7750 (Memorandum Concerning Federal Telecommunications Policy
Act of 1986) [hereinafter Memorandum].
51. Id. ("The Bill would direct the Commission to adopt regulations identical in
substance to the principal continuing provisions of the AT&T and GTE consent
decrees").
52. S. 2565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(B)(6)(b), 132 CONG. REC. at $7747 (June 18,
1986).
53. Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7750. GTOCs, or General Telephone Oper-
ating Companes, are local telephone companies owned by GTE Corporation, which is
subject to its own antitrust consent decree. See United States v. GTE Corp., 603 F.
Supp. 730 (D.D.C. 1984).
54. See Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7750.
55. S. 2565 § 203(a), 132 CONG. REC. at S7750,.
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tion to adopt the regulations. '56 Section 203 also would have
empowered the FCC to grant specific waivers or exemptions
from the terms of the regulations.57
Finally, section 204 declared that any action permitted by the
FCC "shall not ... be deemed to violate any provision of any
final judgment or decree entered before the date of this Act by
any court of the United States in any case arising under the
antitrust laws of the United States."5 " Again, the intended ef-
fect of this provision was explicit and unambiguous; "[t]his pro-
vision makes clear that the decree court may not, in the future,
enforce the decrees to prohibit any conduct expressly permit-
ted by the Commission.
'59
The Bill avowedly would have left unchanged the underlying
laws that the judgment enforces.60  In his introductory re-
marks, Senator Dole made two points that are significant to a
constitutional analysis of the bill. First, he acknowledged that
the Bill was not intended to work any substantive changes in
the antitrust (or communications) laws.6' Second, he stated
that under the Bill, it is the FCC, and not Congress, that would
determine whether any decree changes should be made. After
noting that "[m]ajor public policy questions now arise with re-
spect to whether [the seven Regional Bell Holding Companies]
should be allowed to diversify and expand,"62 Senator Dole
stated, "I am not certain what the answers to these questions
ought to be. And this bill does not provide any answers. "63
56. Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7751.
57. Id.
58. S. 2565 § 204, 132 CONG. REC. at S7750.
59. Memorandum, 132 CONG. REc. at S7751.
60. As summarized in the Memorandum, "[t]he Bill would achieve its objectives
by (a) directing the Commission to adopt regulations identical in substance to the
operative portions of the decrees, (b) empowering the Commission to remedy viola-
tions of the regulations, (c) providing that the Commission may modify or rescind, and
may grant exemptions and waivers from, the regulations if it finds the public interest
would be served, and (d) providing that any act or course of conduct expressly permit-
ted by the regulations or by a Commission exemption, modification, or waiver shall
not be deemed to violate any provision of the decrees." Id.
61. Senator Dole stated that "the courts would, of course, retain jurisdiction to
enforce the antitrust laws, in this industry as in others, against any future violations
of the law." 132 CONG. REC. at S7743 (statement of Senator Dole). In addition, the Bill
would not work any substantive change in the communications laws; the accompany-
ing report declares that "[t]he bill is not an amendment to the Communications Act
of 1934." Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7751.
62. 132 CONG. REC. at S7742 (statement of Senator Dole).
63. Id. (emphasis added). Senator Dole later added, "Here as in other areas, the
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B. Transfer Legislation Would Violate Basic Constitutional
Principles of Separation of Powers
The threshold constitutional issues raised by transfer legisla-
tion concern the very structure of our government and the
proper role of each of its coequal branches. Our constitutional
government is, of course, composed of three separate branches,
each with functionally identifiable powers.64 This "principle of
separation of powers was not simply an abstract generalization
in the minds of the Framers: it was woven into the document
that they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787. "65
Section I of Article III of the Constitution thus vests "[t]he
judicial power of the United States" in specified federal
courts.66 "The inexorable command of this provision is clear
and definite: The judicial power of the United States must be
exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Art.
III. ''6' That judicial power, in turn, "extends to all cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States."6 " In performing this function, the fed-
eral judiciary must be independent of the other two branches.
"The Federal Judiciary was . . .designed by the Framers to
stand independent of the Executive and Legislature - to main-
tain the checks and balances of the constitutional structure,
and also to guarantee that the process of adjudication itself re-
mained impartial.
69
bill makes no judgment as to how or when the electronic publishing prohibition
should be lifted." Id. at S7743 (emphasis added).
64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976). The Supreme Court has rigorously
applied these principles in recent years to invalidate unconstitutional legislation. See
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)
(invalidating a portion of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 on the ground that Congress'
assignment of jurisdiction to bankruptcy judges without life tenure violated guaran-
tees of an independent judiciary) [hereinafter Northern Pipeline]; INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 919 (invalidating a "legislative veto" of executive action because that veto was
legislative in character and had not been passed by both Houses of Congress and
presented to the President); Bowsher v. Synar, 54 U.S.L.W. 5064 (July 7, 1986) (invali-
dating portions of the "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act" because an officer who was
charged with execution of the law was removable by Congress).
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
67. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58-59.
68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
69. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58. The judicial power is vested in "Article III
courts" because only these tribunals enjoy the protection from political influences
that guarantee independent and unbiased judicial decisionmaking. In Northern Pipe-
line, the Court held that backruptcy judges could not adjudicate matters arising under
Article III because those judges did not enjoy the life tenure and protected salary that
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The declared intent of Senate Bill 2565 was to "displace" ex-
isting decrees adjudicated by a federal court.70 The Bill would
have empowered an administrative agency to "modify or re-
scind" what had been, and remains, the judgment of the court.
The bill explicitly would have stripped the court of power to
enforce its judgment in the face of any such modification. It is
difficult to imagine a more direct attempt to interfere with the
independent authority of the federal judiciary. In essence, the
Bill would have subjected the judgment of the district court, as
affirmed by the Supreme Court, to re-examination and revision
by another department of the government.
Three limitations on congressional control over judicial ac-
tion are firmly established: (1) Congress may not eviscerate the
finality of a court's judgment by subjecting that judgment to
continuing review and modification in another forum;71 (2)
Congress may not dictate the manner in which a pending case
must be decided;72 (3) Congress may not itself take judicial ac-
tion by legislatively controlling the application of legal princi-
ples to specific parties.73
Transfer legislation would violate all three principles. Such
legislation would explicitly authorize the FCC to modify or to
rescind the provisions of the final judgments in the AT&T and
GTE antitrust cases. Moreover, in attempting to confer such
authority on the agency, Congress would empower its "dele-
gate" to dictate to the judicial branch how it must decide the
questions arising in these pending cases. Finally, by seeking to
influence the pending AT&T and GTE cases specifically, trans-
fer legislation would impermissibly involve Congress in a judi-
cial function.
1. Congress May Not Authorize Nonjudicial Review of the
Court's Final Decisions
Since 1792, it has been established that Congress may not dis-
turb the finality of a judicial decree by subjecting the decision
are the benchmarks of an independent judiciary. In transferring the jurisdiction of
the courts over an executory judicial decree to an administrative agency, S. 2565 trans-
fers a matter arising under Article III to a tribunal that enjoys none of the protec-
tions of an independent judiciary from political pressures.
70. Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7750.
71. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
72. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).




of a court to review by either the executive branch or Con-
gress.74 At issue in Hayburn's Case was an act of Congress sub-
jecting pension benefits decisions of the circuit courts to review
by the Secretary of War and Congress. In separate opinions,
the Justices of the Supreme Court found that such an alloca-
tion of authority violated the constitutional separation of pow-
ers. As explained in the opinion of the panel including Justices
Wilson and Blair, the Court could not proceed under that
scheme
[b]ecause, if, upon that business, the court had proceeded, its
judgments (for its opinions are its judgments) might, under
the same act, have been revised and controlled by the legisla-
ture, and by an officer in the executive department. Such revi-
sion and control we deemed radically inconsistent with the
independence of the judicial power which is vested in the
courts; and, consequently, with that important principle which
is so strictly observed by the Constitution of the United
States.75
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Cushing similarly explained:
"[B]y the Constitution, neither the Secretary at [sic] War, not
any other Executive officer, not even the legislature, are au-
thorized to sit as a court of errors on the judicial acts or opin-
ions of this court.
'7 6
Precisely like the statute struck down in Hayburn's Case,
transfer legislation purports to give an executive body-the
FCC- continuing power to review and modify the decisions of
the court in the AT&T and GTE antitrust cases. The district
court has ruled, for example, that BOC provision of inter-
exchange telecommunications services would violate the judg-
ment at this time.77 Transfer legislation would give the
Commission full authority to review and overturn that decision
simply by modifying or interpreting its "regulations" to author-
ize Bell Company interexchange services. In Hayburn's Case,
the Secretary of War was given power to review and to modify
the court's decisions; here, the FCC is given that power. Trans-
fer legislation, no less than the statute at issue in Hayburn's
Case, would constitute an improper infringement on the judi-
74. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). Hayburn's Case set forth the views
of three circuit courts, composed of panels including Chief Justice Jay and Justices
Cushing, Wilson, Blair, and Iredell.
75. 2 U.S. at 411 n.2 (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 410.
77. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868.
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cial branch's constitutional duty to exercise its authority free
from nonjudicial review.
2. Congress May Not Prescribe the Rule of Decision in a
Pending Federal Case
In United States v. Klein,78 the Supreme Court again re-
jected a congressional attempt to subvert the integrity of the
judicial process. In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court de-
termined the effect of a presidential pardon on the ability of an
individual to recover property that had been confiscated by
Union soldiers. Specifically, the Court ruled that a pardon enti-
tled the recipient to recover the property under an earlier act
of Congress.
79
In response to that decision, Congress passed a law that pur-
ported to change the effect of a pardon. Congress declared that
a pardon shall be "conclusive evidence" of disloyalty and that,
on proof of such pardon, the jurisdiction of the courts to award
recovery shall cease and the case shall be dismissed. Congress,
however, made no change in the general law governing entitle-
ment to confiscated property. 0
In Klein, the Court held that such an attempt by Congress to
dictate the outcome of cases pending before the courts was un-
constitutional.8 1  The legislation purported to control the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the effect of a pardon, and
thus encroached on the judicial province. 2 In dictating the
manner in which existing law should be interpreted and ap-
plied, "Congress ha[d] inadvertently passed the limit which sep-
arates the legislative and judicial power.
'8 3
The Supreme Court emphasized that this was not a case in
which Congress had changed the underlying right to entitle-
ment: "[I]n the case before us no new circumstances have been
created by legislation.81 4 Rather, the Act simply dictated the
78. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
79. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).
80. Act of July 12, 1870, 16 Stat. 230, 235. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. at 143-
44.
81. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146.
82. The Court held that the legislation also attempted to impair the effect of a
pardon, and thus encroached on the presidential pardon power. Klein, 80 U.S. at 147-
48.




manner in which the federal courts should interpret existing
law and, accordingly, render judgment in a particular case.
Congress has already provided that the Supreme Court shall
have jurisdiction of the judgments of the Court of Claims on
appeal. Can it prescribe a rule in conformity with which the
court must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, be-
cause and only because its decision, in accordance with settled
laws, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the
suitor? This question seems to us to answer itself.8 5
In finding the Act to violate the constitutional separation of
powers, the Court made clear that "[i]t is of vital importance
that those powers be kept distinct.
' '8 6
The Supreme Court recently re-examined the principles of
Klein in United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians.7 The issue
in that case was whether Congress could require a federal court
to re-examine, without application of principles of res judicata,
a claim by the Sioux Nation against the United States that the
Court earlier had rejected on res judicata grounds.
The Court explained that the statute at issue in Klein was
unconstitutional because "it prescribed a rule of decision in a
case pending before the courts, and did so in a manner that re-
quired the courts to decide a controversy in the Government's
favor."' The Court viewed these as separate considerations:
First, of obvious importance to the Klein holding was the fact
that Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at is-
sue in the Government's own favor .... Second, and even more
important, the proviso at issue in Klein had attempted to "pre-
scribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way. '"89
Transfer legislation would explicitly violate Klein by giving
the FCC power to dictate the rule of decision in a pending
85. I&
86. Id.
87. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
88. Id. at 404.
89. Id. at 405. The Court in Sioux Nation ultimately found Klein to be inapplica-
ble for reasons that do not apply to S. 2565. Congress, by waiving the res judicata
defense to the tribe's claim, was merely exercising its broad constitutional power "to
pay the Debts... of the United States," even if that debt was merely a "moral obliga-
tion." Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 397 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1). Unlike the
situation in Klein, Congress had "made no effort ... to control the Court of Claims'
ultimate decision of that claim." Id. at 405. By contrast, S. 2565 would give the FCC
authority to control the district court's ultimate decision of the claims raised in the
underlying lawsuit. Section 204 of the bill declares that any action of the FCC is bind-
ing on the court. 132 CONG. REC. at S7744, S7750.
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case.90 For example, section 203 of Senate Bill 2565 would have
authorized the FCC to "modify or rescind" the decision of the
court. Section 204 would have made those changes binding on
the court. Thus, an FCC decision that BOCs should be allowed
to engage in certain activities would directly prescribe the
court's decision by foreclosing judicial consideration of the pro-
priety of those activities under the decree. "What is this but to
prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular
way?"91 Although defending the constitutionality of Senate
Bill 2565, the Department of Justice's constitutional analysis
conceded that Congress cannot constitutionally enact legisla-
tion "that explicitly directs the outcome of future proceedings
under the decrees."92 However, that is exactly what this bill is
intended to do - "to displace executory decrees of a federal
court.
'9 3
Supporters of transfer legislation, nevertheless, claim its con-
stitutionality can be saved by the principle that, in certain cir-
cumstances, a court will reconsider the validity of a judgment if
Congress works a fundamental change in the laws on which the
judgment was based.94 That is because "the District Court's au-
thority to adopt a consent decree comes only from the statute
which the decree is intended to enforce. 9 5 Yet, at a minimum,
the above principle applies only where Congress actually
changes the underlying law. System Federation No. 91 v.
Wright,96 for example, involved a decree that prohibited estab-
lishment of a "union shop" on the basis of section two of the
90. Although final judgment has been entered, the AT&T case is still pending be-
cause the district court is regularly, almost continually, called on to interpret and
enforce the provisions of the executory injunctive decree. Moreover, the practical
safeguard created by the principle that Congress may not dictate decisions in pending
cases would be nullified if Congress could do after judgment what it could not do
before judgment. Entry of judgment in many ways marks the beginning, not the end,
of injunction cases. If a court is not free to fashion and enforce a decree, then the
court might just as well never decide the lawsuit. Its judgment would become a mere
advisory opinion which the Congress or the executive branch would be free to accept
or reject. The federal courts have long refused to issue advisory opinions. Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968).
91. Klein, 80 U.S. at 146.
92. Douglas H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Re-
marks Before the Computer and Communications Industry Ass'n 10 (July 17, 1986)
(available in the COMM/ENT office, Hastings College of the Law) [hereinafter Gins-
burg Speech].
93. Memorandum, 132 CONG. REC. at S7750.
94. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. at S7750.
95. System Federation No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651 (1961).
96. 364 U.S. 642 (1961).
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Railway Labor Act which forbade discrimination against non-
union employees.a7 After the decree was entered, Congress
amended the Railway Labor Act to permit contracts requiring
union shops. The Supreme Court held that modification of the
earlier court judgment was required.9
No such amendment to the laws on which the AT&T judg-
ment is based would be accomplished by transfer legislation.
For example, Senate Bill 2565's supporters expressly dis-
claimed any intention to modify the antitrust or communica-
tions laws.99 The Bill would not have mandated amendment of
the consent decree's provisions implementing these laws, but
rather would have ordered the FCC to adopt as regulations the
operative portions of the existing decrees. °° The only substan-
tive changes contemplated by the Bill are those to be made by
the FCC.'0 ' Because transfer legislation would not amend the
law, but would merely empower the FCC to control how the
court must apply the law, it would fall squarely under the pro-
hibition announced in United States v. Klein.
3. Transfer Legislation Would Improperly Intrude into the
Judicial Function by Seeking to Influence the
Application of Legal Principles to Specific Parties
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Sioux Nation helps
explain yet another boundary of improper congressional inter-
ference with the judicial function.0 2 To Justice Rehnquist, the
97. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
98. See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. 421 (1855);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (recog-
nizing the same principle but finding no congressional effort to change controlling
law).
99. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
100. As previously noted, Senator Dole repeatedly recognized that, while difficult
questions exist in the telecommunications industry as a result of the AT&T litigation,
"this bill does not provide any answers." 132 CONG. REC. at S7742.
. 101. Recognition of this fact demonstrates, in another manner, the constitutional
infirmity of S. 2565. Since the actions of the FCC will directly modify a decision of the
court, and, under System Federation No. 91, such modifications cannot possibly be
effected without a change in the governing law, the actions of the FCC would run
afoul of the constitutional requirement that "changes in the governing law" be made
in conformity with the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I. See
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954.
102. The majority in Sioux Nation ultimately rejected Klein's applicability because
of the special congressional power to repay obligations. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 391-
407. Justice Rehnquist disagreed. Id. at 428 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). In any event,
the majority's distinction is not applicable here and Justice Rehnquist's analysis of
Klein and Hayburn's Case would therefore govern.
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question is whether Congress has attempted to exercise the ju-
dicial power to decide specific cases.1"3 Certainly, an act of Con-
gress may affect the judicial process. 104 However, "[w]hile
Congress may regulate judicial functions it may not itself exer-
cise them:" 105
The guidelines identified in our opinions ... indicate that while
Congress enjoys broad authority to regulate judicial proceed-
ings in the context of a class of cases, Johannessen v. United
States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912), when Congress regulates functions
of the judiciary in a pending case it walks the line between
judicial and legislative authority, and exceeds that line if it sets
aside a judgment or orders retrial of a previously adjudicated
issue.'
06
This same distinction between legislation of specific and gen-
eral applicability was relied on by Justice Powell in his recent
separate opinion in INS v. Ohadha. °7 Justice Powell found that
the legislative veto in that case was unconstitutional because
Congress had "assumed a judicial function in violation of the
principle of separation of powers."'0 8 To Justice Powell, when
one House of Congress undertook its own determination of the
propriety of the Attorney General's decisions in six specific im-
migration cases, "it... assumed a function ordinarily entrusted
to the federal courts,"'1 9 or, at least, "a function that generally
is entrusted to an impartial tribunal.""'
Transfer legislation would similarly authorize an exercise of
judicial power by regulating the rights and obligations of spe-
cific parties in a pending case rather than any class of cases."'
For example, the legislative history of Senate Bill 2565 explic-
103. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 428-29.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 429 (emphasis in original).
106. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
107. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
108. Id. at 960.
109. Id. at 965.
110. Id. at n.8.
111. S. 2565 would have been no less judicial because Congress has delegated to the
FCC the ultimate substantive decisions as to whether and how the judgment should
be modified. An exercise of judicial power may occur even when Congress does not
dictate the ultimate outcome of the case:
The fact that Congress did not dictate to the Court of Claims that a particular
result be reached does not in any way negate the fact that it has sought to
exercise judicial power. This Court and other appellate courts often reverse
a trial court for error without indicating what the result should be when the
claim is heard again.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 430 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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itly declared that the "provisions of the Bill would be applica-
ble only to AT&T, GTE, the BOCs, and the GTOCs".'12 The
lack of general applicability and the exclusive reference to par-
ties already involved in litigation most clearly signals that
transfer legislation is a judicial act, outside the realm of con-
gressional authority.1 3 The Department of Justice itself ac-
knowledged that Congress could not "enact legislation that
operates directly on the AT&T and GTE decrees by vacating or
modifying them statutorily.11 4 Congress may not delegate to
the FCC power that Congress itself does not possess and the
Bill would authorize Congress to vacate or modify these judi-
cial decrees.
4. Conclusion
Each of the constitutional objections discussed above relates
to the same basic principle: Congress may not interfere with
the judicial branch's execution of its constitutional functions.
The Constitution mandates that the courts be free to undertake
their responsibilities without supervision by the other depart-
ments of government. Any legislative attempt to transfer ad-
ministration of the AT&T and GTE decrees to an executive
agency would be an improper encroachment on the indepen-
dence of the federal judiciary and a violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
C. Transfer Legislation is Bad Policy
Transfer legislation would not only be unconstitutional, it
would also be bad policy. While the federal courts are institu-
tionally competent to administer antitrust decrees fairly, the
FCC is not and the BOC diversification into competitive mar-
kets that the transfer legislation is designed to facilitate would
pose a serious risk to consumers.
112. Memorandum, 132 CONG REC. at S7750.
113. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 965-66 (Powell, J., concurring): Sioux Nation,
448 U.S. at 430 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. Ginsburg Speech, supra note 92, at 10. In commenting on a bill to remove
federal court jurisdiction to enforce certain remedies in school desegregation cases,
then Attorney General William French Smith also noted that an "attempt to exert
direct control over a court order would raise constitutional problems associated with
legislative revisions of judgments." Letter from Attorney General William French
Smith to Peter W. Rodino, Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary, 12 (May 6,
1982), reprinted in Statutory Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 319 (1982).
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1. Sound Practical Reasons Require Federal Courts to
Continue to Administer the AT&T Decree
(a) Federal Courts Have Traditionally Administered
Antitrust Decrees
Throughout almost a century of antitrust law enforcement,
the federal courts-and only the federal courts-have adminis-
tered restrictions imposed in antitrust consent decrees. The su-
pervisory role of the courts follows inevitably from the origin
of decrees in the judicial process, but judicial administration of
antitrust consent decrees makes good practical sense as well.
The federal courts are uniquely qualified to apply complex an-
titrust principles. The judge approving a settlement decree is
intimate with its terms and background, the details of past ille-
gal conduct, and the circumstances that allowed the illegal con-
duct to occur.11 The antitrust court alone is situated to
administer the decree and to consider whether any changed cir-
cumstances or conditions warrant any modification.
(b) Judge Greene Has Administered the AT&T Decree
Fairly and Impartially
The record of impartial and principled judicial administra-
tion of the AT&T consent decree to date vindicates the trust
and confidence historically placed in the judiciary. The decree
court has from the beginning shown extreme concern for the
well-being and economic stability of the BOCs, which have
flourished under the MFJ. For example, although the Depart-
ment of Justice and AT&T would have restricted the BOCs ex-
clusively to offering local telephone service, Judge Greene
required that they be allowed to publish lucrative Yellow Pages
directories and to market telephones and other customer prem-
ises equipment.1 6
In addition, Judge Greene required that the MFJ provide for
waiver of the line-of-business restrictions on terms less restric-
tive than would otherwise 'have applied under the antitrust
law. 7 Under this standard, the BOCS are entitled to a waiver
115. See South v. Rowe, 759 F.2d 610, 613 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (the interpretation of a
decree by a judge long involved with the underlying dispute is entitled to deference);
Brown v. Neeb, 644 F.2d 551, 558 n.12 (6th Cir. .1981). As noted above, before the
AT&T case was settled, Judge Greene heard over ninety percent of the parties' evi-
dence, as well as their legal arguments. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 152.
116. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 191-94.
117. See id. at 195.
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of the line-of-business restrictions on a showing that there is no
substantial possibility that they could use their local monopoly
power to impede competition in the market of their new ven-
ture.11 This standard favors the BOCs because the standard
normally used in antitrust consent decrees permits modifica-
tion only when unforeseen "changes [in competitive conditions]
are so important that dangers, once substantial, have become
attenuated to a shadow." 11 9 Adoption of any standard less pro-
tective than the MFJ's "substantial possibility" test would be
nonsensical. Especially after the long history of abuse of the
BOCs' monopoly position, no court or regulator could ration-
ally waive an antitrust restriction where there was a substan-
tial possibility that a BOC would use its monopoly power to
impede competition.
Under this waiver procedure, the BOCs have to date been
granted more than 100 (and denied only two) waivers of the
line-of-business restrictions, allowing them to participate in
fields ranging from real estate to foreign telecommunications
to publishing. 20 As noted above, one of the most remarkable
aspects of the present debate about the MFJ restrictions is that
the BOCs have never gone before the decree court to contend
that they lack the monopoly power over the local bottleneck
that creates the substantial possibility that they could impede
competition in access-dependent markets through discrimina-
tion and cross-subsidization. The BOCs undoubtedly realize
they would not be able to satisfy Judge Greene, the court of
appeals, and ultimately the Supreme Court that no such sub-
stantial possibility exists.
12 '
118. MFJ, Section VIII(C), 552 F. Supp. at 231.
119. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). Cf. AT&T, 552 F. Supp.
at 195.
120. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LINE OF BUSINESS WAIVER REQUESTS SUBMITTED TO
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO SECTION VIII(C) OF THE MODIFICATION OF
FINAL JUDGMENT § III (Feb. 6, 1987). One testament to the fairness and reasonable-
ness of Judge Greene's decisions is that only four appeals have been taken from his
rulings. In two of those cases, the appellate courts upheld Judge Greene summarily.
See Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); California v. United States, 464
U.S. 1013 (1983). In a third case, United States v. Western Elec. Co., 777 F.2d 23 (D.C.
Cir. 1985), the court dismissed the appeal on jurisdictional grounds. In one instance,
the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed only one aspect of the decision
below. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986), petition for
cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3373 (Nov. 25, 1986) (No. 86-776).
121. While transfer legislation such as S. 2565 would require the FCC to incorpo-
rate this standard in its initial regulations, it also explicilty authorizes the FCC to
modify the standard or waive its application to specific companies. In light of the
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The MFJ line-of-business restrictions-and the court's ad-
ministration of them-are therefore limited in time and in
scope. The line-of-business restrictions will expire by their own
terms when the local exchange becomes competitive. Even
before divestiture it was recognized that over time the BOCs
might lose their monopoly power in exchange telecommunica-
tions and the resulting "ability to leverage their monopoly
power into the competitive markets from which they must now
be barred.' 22 Conversely, the restrictions would remain in
effect "until such time as the [BOCs] lose their bottleneck mo-
nopolies and there is substantial competition in local telecom-
munications service. ' 12 ' To monitor the situation, Judge
Greene established a procedure for periodic review of the com-
petitive status of the local exchange in order to evaluate the
continuing need for the restrictions on BOC activities. 124 The
Department of Justice was due to report to the court in Janu-
ary of 1987 on whether the decree restrictions should be
retained.1
25
public statements of the FCC attacking the line-of-business restrictions, see infra text
accompanying note 130, it is obvious that the FCC would be prepared to allow waivers
in the current competitive environment despite the existing substantial possibility of
abuse of monopoly power.
122. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 194.
123. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 968. The court also left
open the possibility that "technological development.., or changes in the structure of
the competitive markets" may eliminate the need for the restrictions. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. at 194. See also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868 (referring
to "significant technological or structural changes" in the information services and
equipment manufacturing markets). There has been no change in the structure of the
interexchange market that would diminish the BOCs' ability to impede competition
through the control of local exchange bottlenecks; the providers, customers, and tech-
nologies for providing interexchange service have not changed significantly since
divestiture.
124. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 195.
125. Id. [Ed. note: The report was filed on Monday, February 2, 1987, Report and
Recommendations of the United States Concerning the Line of Business Restrictions
Imposed on the Bell Operating Companies by the Modification of Final Judgment,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., No. 82-0192 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 2, 1987).] The need
for these restrictions remains because the BOCs still possess the bottleneck control of
the local telephone networks that made the line-of-business restrictions essential in
the first place. As then-Assistant Attorney General Ginsburg testified to Congress,
"[s]urely households and, in terms of absolute numbers, all but a small minority of
businesses continue to face a monopoly provider of local exchange services and of
access to long distance and information carriers." Hearings on the Competitive Status
of Bell Operating Companies: Diversification and its Impact on Consumers Before
the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection and Finance,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (March 13, 1986) [here-
inafter March 1986 Hearings] (statement of Douglas H. Ginsburg); Letter from Doug-
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(c) Court-Stripping Legislation Would Set a Dangerous
Precedent for Other Controversial Cases
Legislation that would release the BOCs from the restric-
tions to which they voluntarily agreed in order to avoid an ad-
verse antitrust judgment would only invite other defendants
with losing antitrust cases to turn to Congress for relief that
they could not obtain on the merits in judicial proceedings.
Congress should not give adjudicated antitrust violators this
kind of encouragement.
In addition, any transfer of jurisdiction would set the stage
for similar transfers in other controversial areas of the law.
For example, the same rationale could be used to support trans-
fer of the administration of school desegregation orders to the
Department of Education, affirmative action decrees to the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, or future anti-
trust decrees in other industries to any of a multitude of regula-
tory agencies. Congress has long and wisely resisted invitations
to entertain such court-stripping legislation.
D. The FCC is Not Suited to Administer any Sherman Act
Decree, and Certainly Not the AT&T Decree
1. The FCC Is Not Generally Authorized to Protect
Antitrust Interests
Precisely because Sherman Act decrees are intended to re-
solve antitrust problems, not telecommunications policy issues,
the FCC is not the proper enforcement forum. Courts have
long recognized that the FCC "may not adequately safeguard
antitrust interests."'26 As a result, "the federal courts, not the
FCC, have the primary responsibility for the enforcement of
las H. Ginsburg to John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce at 12 (Oct. 2, 1986) ("the RBOCs now have bottleneck control over local
exchange service"). Similarly, the court recently found that the BOCs "for the time
being continue to be the only meaningful providers of local service for the vast major-
ity of subscribers." United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 868 n.90. See
also United States v. Western Elec. Co., 627 F. Supp. 1090, 1095 n.16 (D.D.C.), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 797 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The economic and other factors
that severely restrict alternatives to BOC local networks are discussed in more detail
in MCI's submission to a consultant retained by the Department of Justice in connec-
tion with the January 1987 report. MCI's Response to Certain Questions Concerning
the Continued Need for the Line-of-Business Restrictions on the Bell Companies at
13-17 and Attachment A (June 18, 1986) (available in the COMM/ENT office, Has-
tings College of the Law) [hereinafter MCI Response].
126. Mid-Texas Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 615
F.2d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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the antitrust laws. 1 27 Indeed, although the FCC now appar-
ently supports the removal of judicial authority, it previously
explicitly acknowledged that it does "not have authority to en-
force the Sherman Act.' 2 Again recently, the FCC confirmed
the propriety of leaving to the Department of Justice and the
courts the enforcement of the antitrust laws, and pointed to the
MFJ as a remedy for what it described as competitive
"anomalies."129
2. The FCC Has Prejudged the Issues
The FCC is particularly ill-suited to administer the MFJ be-
cause the FCC has outspokenly indicated that it is unable to
enforce impartially the consent decree provisions. Without
seeking public comment or compiling any public record, the
Commission has called for the elimination or drastic modifica-
tion of the main competitive protections now provided by the
MFJ. FCC Chairman Mark Fowler has stated, "The Commis-
sion as a whole, and I, individually, consistently have held the
view that the MFJ should not restrict activities of the regional
Bell companies."' 3 ° At a minimum, this position reflects a con-
sistent insensitivity to the Sherman Act requirements which
are at the heart of the MFJ.1
3 1
3. The FCC Has No Special Ability to Deal With the Non-
Antitrust Issues the BOCs Claim the District
Court Ignores
The MFJ affects only a very narrow aspect of telecommuni-
cations policy. In introducing Senate Bill 2565, Senator Dole
suggested that actions of the decree court must inevitably clash
127. Essential Communications Systems, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 F.2d
1114, 1122 (3d Cir. 1979).
128. In Re Petition of AT&T for a Declaratory Ruling and Expedited Relief, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, FCC 78-142, 67 F.C.C.2d 1455, 1477 (adopted Feb. 23,
1978), rev'd on other grounds, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978).
129. In re Applications of James F. Rill and Pacific Telesis Group, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, FCC 86-251, 60 RAD. REG. 2d (P&F) 583, paras. 41 & 48 (adopted
May 15, 1986).
130. Letter from Chairman Mark S. Fowler to Congressman John Dingell (D-Mi.)
(Nov. 13, 1985).
131. Since it is so clear that the FCC has already made up its mind about these
issues, and because the FCC has no expertise in applying Sherman Act principles, see
supra text accompanying notes 126-29, the FCC is not a proper body even to review,
much less resolve, waiver applications submitted by the BOCs.
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with regulatory agency decisions concerning foreign trade, job
protection, national security, and communications policy mat-
ters.1 32 However, neither the FCC, the State Department, nor
any other federal agency has found it appropriate even to file
comments on any issue pending before the court since the con-
sent decree was approved-even though the court has demon-
strated its willingness to defer to the relevant executive branch
agency.1 33 The FCC, with appropriate congressional oversight,
retains sole power to establish federal telecommunications pol-
icy in areas properly within its domain. The FCC itself has
noted that the MFJ does nothing to diminish the FCC's
authority.
134
Moreover, the FCC, which would administer the AT&T de-
cree under transfer legislation, has no special competence in
the areas for which supporters of such legislation claim agency
expertise is required. Foreign trade is a good example. The
line-of-business restrictions have little or no impact on the bal-
ance of trade. The trade deficit in telecommunications prod-
ucts has resulted not from the line-of-business restrictions, but
from the historically strong dollar and the absence in the
United States market of the artificial interconnect restrictions
that typify those markets in foreign countries. 135 There is al-
ready ample capacity in the domestic manufacturing market.
Adding to that capacity will not help the trade deficit; only re-
duced foreign trade barriers and a reasonably-valued dollar will
have an impact.
Indeed, the existence of the line-of-business restrictions cre-
ates an environment which encourages the innovation by
132. 132 CONG. REC. at S7743 (statement of Senator Dole).
133. The court has, for example, deferred to the FCC's authority over such matters
as the national plan-for assignment of area codes and telephone.numbers, AT&T, 552
F. Supp. at 197, and access rates for interexchange carriers, id. at 200, and the extra-
territorial provision of cellular telephone services, United States v. Western Elec. Co.,
797 F.2d 1082, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Judge Greene's approach is consistent with well-
established judicial rules governing deference to agencies with superior expertise.
See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, (1984) (courts traditionally accord "deference to
the political branches in matters of foreign policy"); Stencel Aero Engineering Corp.
v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 673 (1977) (courts defer to military judgment on matters
affecting military discipline).
134. Brief for Federal Communications Commission as Amicus Curiae at 27-28
(Apr. 20, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No. 82-0192).
135. See Pressman, Telecommunications: Looking to Hill for Help, CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 194 (Feb. 1, 1986). Some American trade officials have suggested that
the value of the dollar was responsible for perhaps as much as two-thirds or more of
last year's U.S. trade deficit. Id.
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American manufacturers that is necessary to succeed in world
markets. Relaxation of the restrictions would reduce the in-
centives of American competitors to innovate for fear that an
important market segment-the BOCs themselves as purchas-
ers-would be foreclosed to them. Thus, to the extent that
BOC entry into the equipment market would restore BOC in-
centives to discriminate against existing competitors, those
manufacturers would become less able to compete at home or
abroad and foreign trade will in the long run suffer as a result.
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the BOCs
would conduct manufacturing operations within the United
States rather than elect to take advantage of cheaper labor
overseas. Ameritech has already announced plans to manufac-
ture overseas the equipment that it is now permitted to market
only in foreign countries.136 Obviously, if permitted to enter the
domestic market, Ameritech would have substantial incentive
to use an existing overseas plant to manufacture equipment for
sale in the United States. Historically, independent equipment
manufacturers have exported a much greater percentage of
their production than has the monopoly telephone industry.3 7
Thus, permitting the BOCs into the equipment manufacturing
business does not imply that they will export more than they
import or that they will employ American workers.
4. The FCC Has No Regulatory Tools Unavailable to the
Court that Can Prevent Discrimination and
Cross-Subsidization
The FCC still has no effective ability to deal with BOC dis-
crimination and cross-subsidization in the absence of the line-
of-business restrictions. As discussed above, 38 no regulatory
safeguards short of line-of-business restrictions have histori-
cally been effective to prevent BOC cross-subsidization and to
enforce anti-discrimination rules against the BOCs. It is pre-
cisely because of the shortcomings of the regulatory process
that the government sought the AT&T divestiture in the first
place. None of the alleged "changes" in regulatory practices,
which the BOCs claim permit the FCC to prevent anticompeti-
136. See Communications Daily, June 27, 1986, at 2.
137. March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 7 (written statement of John J. Mc-
Donnell, Jr.).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 11-22.
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tive abuses by vertically integrated BOCs' will work.13 9
For example, the BOCs have recently espoused a new "solu-
tion" to the inability of regulators to enforce antidiscrimination
rules. With encouragement from the FCC, the BOCs claim
they should be permitted to provide information services be-
cause a new kind of network design called Open Network Ar-
chitecture (ONA) would prevent discrimination.140  But ONA
offers no present protection against these abuses because, as
the BOCs themselves concede, the necessary computer technol-
ogy design and development will take at least several years to
complete. 41 Under the FCC's rules, the BOCs need not even
file their plans for ONA until at least 1988.142 It will take even
longer for the BOCs to deploy ONA in hundreds of computer-
controlled switches used by the BOCs to route telephone calls
to their destination. The present inability to implement ONA
reflects a lack of definition and agreement on the specific char-
acteristics of this network design. 143 Indeed, the head of one
Regional Bell Company candidly described open architecture
as simply "a state of mind."'
1 44
139. For a more detailed and technical discussion of current issues relating to dis-
crimination and cross subsidy, see MCI Response, supra note 125, at 17-34.
140. The FCC's definition of ONA involves separate provision by the local tele-
phone company of each interconnection element or feature so that other telecommu-
nications providers dependent on access to the local exchange will have maximum
flexibility in their interconnection arrangements. In the Matter of Amendment of
Section 64.702 of the Commissions Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Report and Order in Docket No. 85-229, FCC 86-252, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1064-65 (1986)
[hereinafter Computer III, Report and Order].
141. According to Pacific Telesis, open architecture implementation may come
"some time in the next decade" and even then will not be a "panacea." Reply Com-
ments of Pacific Bell, Nevada Bell, PacTel Communications Companies, and Pacific
Telesis Group at 24, In the Matter of Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commis-
sion's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Notice of Inquiry in Docket
No. 85-229 (dated Jan. 20, 1986).
142. Computer III, Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d para. 220 at 1067. Public com-
ment and FCC review and approval will be required before any such plans can be
implemented. Id.
143. See Reply Comments of Southwestern Bell Corporation at 31, In the Matter of
Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations, Notice of
Inquiry in Docket No. 85-229 (filed Jan. 21, 1986) (open architecture "is little more
than a concept at this time").
144. The Spur, vol. 4, no. 3, at 2 (U S WEST internal newsletter quoting Jack
McAllister). Even after its eventual implementation, open architecture will not be
the solution to the problem of potential discrimination. In light of the history of
AT&T, it is at best short-sighted to maintain that the ability of an exchange monopo-
list to discriminate in access can be eliminated without a structural remedy. For a
more detailed discussion of why open architecture will merely complicate the prob-
lem of discrimination, see MCI Response, supra note 125, at 30-33.
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The FCC remains similarly unable to deal with BOC cross-
subsidization. There are two basic regulatory methods to pre-
vent cross-subsidization: accounting rules and separate subsidi-
ary requirements. The FCC now claims that cost accounting
rules can prevent cross-subsidization. However, the Commis-
sion itself has conceded the inadequacy of its past attempts to
devise rational and enforceable accounting rules,'45 and as testi-
mony at recent House Telecommunications Subcommittee
hearings confirms, accounting techniques cannot prevent BOC
misconduct. The Consumer Federation of America testified
that "[n]o accounting system has yet been devised that can ade-
quately detect a misallocation of the costs of jointly used equip-
ment and resources."' 46 Sharon Nelson testified on behalf of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
that she was personally "skeptical that accounting rules will
protect the public."' 47
Separate subsidiaries do not provide significantly better pro-
tection than accounting rules against manipulation of costs be-
tween regulated and unregulated subsidiaries-and provide no
protection against discrimination. The regulated affiliates can
transfer assets (facilities, financial resources, personnel) to un-
regulated affiliates at less than current market value or the
unregulated affiliate can sell assets or services to the regulated
affiliate at a price above market value. Again the Yellow Pages
experience provides an excellent example. Even though BOCs
have put their Yellow Pages in separate subsidiaries, the chair-
man of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities told
Congress that "basically what we are seeing there is the ulti-
mate form of cross-subsidization. We are seeing a bleeding of
the local operating company by a holding company."' 48
145. See In re Separation of Costs of Regulated Telephone Service from Costs of
Nonregulated Activities, Notice of Proposed Rule Making on Docket No. 86-111, FCC
86-146, 104 F.C.C.2d paras 16-29, 67-73 (adopted April 3, 1986).
146. March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 16 (written testimony of Gene Kim-
melman, Consumer Federation of America).
147. Transition in the Long Distance Telephone Industry: Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. 155 (1986) (written
testimony of Sharon L. Nelson, Chairman, Washington Utilities and Transportation
Commission).
148. March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 333 (testimony of Paul Levy, Chair-
man, Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities).
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5. The Diversification That the Transfer Legislation Is
Intended to Facilitate Will Not Benefit
Consumers
The Department of Justice has repeatedly admitted that
BOC diversification will not help keep down local rates. In
fact, former Assistant Attorney General Douglas Ginsburg has
described as "misleading and dangerous" the idea that relaxing
the antitrust restrictions on the BOCs will help to hold down
local rates. 149 The BOCs have explicitly agreed with Mr. Gins-
burg's analysis.'5 ° Indeed, they have expressly disavowed any
intention to use the profits or revenues from their new venture
activities to hold down local rates.'5'
Some BOCs have claimed that their entry into these markets
will eventually benefit local rates as increased competition
stimulates local exchange traffic and more efficient use of the
local network.'52 However, this indirect benefit of traffic stim-
ulation is already being brought about by the vigorous competi-
tion of non-BOC competitors. The efficiency benefits caused by
increased local traffic will be realized regardless of who pro-
vides the services in the competitive market.
State commissions that have studied BOC diversification
have found little benefit to the general public.5 3 The Yellow
Pages experience demonstrates that this conclusion is correct.
The original consent decree proposed by the Department of
149. March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 83 (written testimony of Douglas H.
Ginsburg). Mr. [now Judge] Ginsburg has also stated that anyone who believes that
"alleged profits from [BOC] diversification will lead to lower telephone rates is in-
dulging in wishful thinking." D. Ginsburg, Speech at Airlie House (Apr. 29, 1986),
quoted in Communications Daily, Apr. 30, 1986, at 4.
150. See, e.g. Letter from BellSouth Chairman J.L. Clendenin to Congressman
Timothy E. Wirth, (Apr. 14, 1986), reprinted in March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125,
at 362-63.
151. "In our view it is not reasonable to expect that basic local telephone service
rates will decline from present levels as a consequence of removal of the MFJ restric-
tions." Letter from H. Laird Walker, US WEST, to Congressman Timothy E. Wirth
(Apr. 25, 1986), reprinted in March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 413. "We do not
suggest [that Bell entry in the information services, manufacturing, and inter-
exchange services line-of-business] would result in rates lower than today's .... Let-
ter from Robert A. Dickemper, Southwestern Bell Corporation, to Congressman
Timothy E. Wirth (Apr. 15, 1986), reprinted in March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125,
at 409.
152. See, e.g., Letter from Ivan G. Seidenberg, NYNEX Corp. (the Bell holding
company in New York and New England), to Congressman Timothy E. Wirth (Apr.
25, 1986), reprinted in March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 367.
153. NATIONAL REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNREGULATED ENTERPRISES
OF THE BELL REGIONAL HOLDING COMPANIES v (March, 1986).
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Justice and the Bell System would have barred the BOCs from
publishing Yellow Pages and similar directories.5 Congress
and Judge Greene, however, recognized that this proposed ban
would remove a "significant subsidy to local telephone
rates."'15 5 The Florida Public Service Commission had indi-
cated during the divestiture proceedings that Southern Bell
"reaped a monopoly profit of over 5000% from its yellow pages
operations"'56 and other states made similar profitability esti-
mates.15 7 As a result, the House Telecommunications Subcom-
mittee approved legislation to allow the BOCs to publish
Yellow Pages. 58 The need for such legislation was mooted
when Judge Greene insisted on a modification of the decree to
preserve the Yellow Pages' contribution to local rates.
However, many of the BOCs broke faith with Congress and
the court, and chose to divert their Yellow Pages revenue away
from the support of local telephone service. Most of the BOCs
have established separate subsidiaries for their directory pub-
lishing operations,'159 abandoning the intent of both Congress
and the court that the revenues derived from Yellow Pages
continue to support local ratepayers. With this move, the BOCs
154. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 193-94.
155. Id. at 194.
156. Brief of Florida Public Service Commission on Restrictions and Demands on
the Bell Operating companies at 11, (filed June 14, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No.
82-0025(PI)).
157. See, e.g. Brief of the Kansas Commission on Restrictions and Demands on the
Bell Operating Companies at 5, (filed June 11, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No. 82-
0025(PI)) (estimating that in Kansas Southwestern Bell earned over $26 million in
directory publishing with expenses under $6 million); Brief of the Public Service
Commission of the District of Columbia on Topic Number Two of the Court's May 25,
1982 Memorandum: Restrictions and Demands on the Bell Operating Companies at
3, (filed June 25, 1982), AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (No. 82-0025(PI)) (estimating that
C&P Telephone Co. earned over $25 million in directory publishing with expenses
under $13 million).
158. See March 1986 Hearings, supra note 125, at 2 (statement of Congressman
Wirth).
159. For example, Ameritech, US WEST, BellSouth and Southwestern Bell have
all indicated that they have established directory publishing operations in separate
subsidiaries. See the following docket submissions in In re Policy and Rules Concern-
ing the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced Services and Cellu-
lar Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies, Docket No. 83-115:
Report on Yellow Pages Operations of Illinois Bell Tel. Co., Indiana Bell Tel. Co.,
Michigan Bell Tel. Co., The Ohio Bell Tel. Co., and Wisconsin Bell, Inc., at 1 (Feb. 28,
1984); Structural Operations Report of US WEST: Directory Publishing, at 1-2 (Feb.
28, 1984); Letter from John F. Beasley, Associate General Counsel, BellSouth Corp.,
to William J. Tricarico, Secretary, FCC, at 1 (Feb. 28, 1984); Report of the Southwest-
ern Bell Companies On Services to Be Shared and Associated Costing Methodologies,
at 30-31 (Feb. 28, 1984).
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have made it clear that Yellow Pages profits "are not available
to offset rates for local service. "160 As Judge Greene has now
concluded, "it is likely that the competitive ventures of [the
BOCs], which rely in a number of ways on the funds generated
by the ratepayers, will not share the profits from these ven-
tures with the ratepayers.'
161
At the same time that the BOCs are refusing to use revenues
from competitive ventures to keep local rates down, they are
proposing to enter capital intensive markets such as long dis-
tance. This money would be invested in some of today's riskiest
and most competitive markets. Indeed, as one consultant to the
BOCs recently suggested, the restrictions may be necessary to
protect the BOCs from themselves, since they have probably
saved the BOCs from wasting "$5 billion in dumb acquisi-
tions.' 62 In fact, one study found that the BOCs are already
losing almost a billion dollars a year on their new ventures.
1 63
Based on the available evidence, the only reasonable prediction
is that accelerated new venture activites by the BOCs would
drain off BOC resources and cause increases in local rates.
IV
Conclusion
The preceding sections show that judicial enforcement of the
line-of-business restrictions is necessary to achieve fair compe-
160. Report on Yellow Pages Operations of Illinois Bell Tel. Co., Indiana Bell Tel.
Co., Michigan Bell Tel. Co., The Ohio Bell Tel. Co., Wisconsin Bell, Inc. at 1, Policy
and Rules Concerning the Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment, Enhanced
Services and Cellular Communications Services by the Bell Operating Companies,
Docket No. 83-115 (filed Feb. 28, 1984).
161. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. at 866.
162. Wall St. J., June 9, 1986, at 44, col. 2 (quoting Howard Anderson, president of
Yankee Group).
163. A study by the North American Telecommunications Association (NATA) re-
vealed that the competitive subsidiaries of the BOCs lost over $939 million in 1985.
Comments of NATA to Notice of Proposed Rule Making, at 43-44, In the Matter of
Furnishing of Customer Premises Equipment by the Bell Operating Companies and
the Independent Telephone Companies, Docket No. 86-79 (filed May 16, 1986). See
also Spievack, The Bell RHCs' Broken Bargain, 3(6) TELEMATICS, at 11, 13 (June 1986).
Another study has concluded that "few of the new activities seem to have much po-
tential for high profits," and that the profitability of CPE manufacturing is a "particu-
larly poor prospect in today's more competitive environment." NATIONAL
REGULATORY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNREGULATED ENTERPRISES OF THE BELL RE-
GIONAL HOLDING COMPANIES v, at 13 (March 1986). BOC diversification "has not
boosted profits or enhanced shareholder value." N. YELSEY, SALOMON BROTHERS,
INC. FINANCIAL OUTLOOK FOR THE BELL REGIONAL COMPANIES 3 (June 1986).
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tition in access-dependent markets. Attempts to transfer en-
forcement responsibility from the federal courts to the FCC
violate fundamental principles of separation of powers and
would defeat sound public policy. The BOCs have failed to
carry their burden to demonstrate a change in circumstances
which would justify or require any change in the carefully
structured consent decree mechanism designed to facilitate and
encourage fair competition in the telecommunications industry.
Indeed, far from demonstrating any need for change, devel-
opments since divestiture prove that the judicial enforcement
of the judgment has achieved the goals of the antitrust laws and
furthered consumer welfare and choice. The line-of-business
restrictions have permitted competition in telecommunications
products and services to begin to flower. Even the public state-
ments of the BOCs extoll the virtues of this new competition
and the spectacular growth in the variety and choice of tele-
communications products available to American consumers.
Hundreds of new American firms have entered the markets for
customer premises equipment, information services, and long-
distance communications in the three years since divestiture
broke AT&T's longstanding monopoly. There is nothing to
suggest that the BOCs could or would provide any services that
are not already widely available from experienced competitors
in these markets. When asked what new services the BOCs
might provide, the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration could say only that they "can't be pre-
dicted in advance.'
1 64
With the intensification of price and service competition
among interexchange carriers, information service providers,
and telecommunications equipment manufacturers, even rela-
tively small competitive advantages could have a severe ad-
verse impact both on existing competition and on consumers.
Removal of the line-of-business restrictions would restore BOC
incentives to use their ability to stifle competition. In the end,
the consumer would pay through higher prices and reduced
choice and diversity in telecommunications products and
services.
Existing businesses are able and eager to meet the telecom-
munications needs of the American public and the BOCs can




perform an essential function by efficiently providing the nec-
essary local transmission services at reasonable prices. On the
other hand, the BOCs' monopoly control over the local ex-
change gives them the power to impede developing competition
and diminish the variety of new products offered by non-BOC
competitors. Modification of the line-of-business restrictions
would likely return the nation to an era of more limited con-
sumer choice. Indeed, the mere presence of BOCs in the equip-
ment manufacturing and long distance markets would serve as
a substantial barrier to the entry of new competitors because it
has been abundantly demonstrated that control over the local
exchange can provide numerous unfair advantages to the
BOCs.
What Congress needs to address are not the false issues con-
cerning the transfer legislation but the real telecommunica-
tions issues of rising local rates and the increasing
telecommunications trade imbalance. While long distance rates
have fallen by approximately thirty percent since divestiture,
local rates have increased by forty-five percent or more than $5
billion during the same period.165 The risk to universal, afford-
able local telephone service posed by these enormous increases
is compounded by the BOCs' diversification frenzy financed by
record monopoly revenues and profits. Congress should be
searching for ways to control BOC diversification, not encour-
aging entry into the access-dependent markets from which the
BOCs are now barred. Similarly, a Congress concerned about
the rising telecommunications trade deficit should focus on the
artificial trade barriers erected by foreign countries and on the
strength of the U.S. dollar, for it is those factors, not the line-of-
business restrictions that are the cause of current difficulties.
The AT&T decree put to rest decades of turmoil in the tele-
communications industry. Relaxation of the line-of-business
restrictions would once again raise that turmoil to a feverish
pitch. Instead, the MFJ should be permitted to continue to
achieve its goal of fostering increased competition with result-
ing increases in consumer choice and decreases in cost. The
public should be looking for imaginative solutions to emerging
problems, not undoing the effective and proven solution of the
165. Bus. WK. (Feb. 16, 1987) at 28; CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA, DIVESTI.
TURE PLUS THREE: STILL CRAZY AFTER ALL THESE YEARS 8 (Dec. 1986).
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past-the fair and effective enforcement of the line-of-business
restrictions by the federal courts.
